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Access to medicine and the dangers of patent 
linkage: Lessons from Bayer Corp v Union of 
India 
Mabel Tsui 
In February 2010, the Delhi High Court delivered its decision in Bayer Corp v Union 
of India in which Bayer had appealed against an August 2009 decision of the same 
court. Both decisions prevented Bayer from introducing the concept of patent 
linkage into India’s drug regulatory regime. Bayer appealed to the Indian Supreme 
Court, the highest court in India, which agreed on 2 March 2010 to hear the appeal. 
Given that India is regarded as a global pharmaceutical manufacturer of generic 
medications, how its judiciary and government perceive their international 
obligations has a significant impact on the global access to medicines regime. In 
rejecting the application of patent linkage, the case provides an opportunity for India 
to further acknowledge its international human rights obligations.  
INTRODUCTION 
On 9 February 2010, the appeal division of the Delhi High Court in India delivered 
its decision in Bayer Corp v Union of India (unrep, Delhi High Court, Muralidhar J, 9 
February 2010),1 rejecting Bayer Corporation‟s (Bayer) attempt to introduce a 
condition into India‟s Drug and Cosmetics Act 1940 (IND) which would have 
required the Drug Controller-General of India (DCGI), in making a decision on 
whether to grant marketing approval to a new drug, to have regard to whether the 
drug in question was subject to a patent – a system known as “patent linkage”. 
Bayer appealed to the Indian Supreme Court, which admitted the appeal in March 
2010.  
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A case which considers India‟s domestic legislative schemes regarding the safety 
and regulation of drugs may appear to hold little significance for the global access to 
medicine regime – until one takes into account India‟s role in relation to generic 
medications globally.2 For example, in 2005 approximately 70% of HIV/AIDS 
patients in Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) programs relied on antiretroviral (ARV) 
drugs from India, while worldwide, approximately half of those on ARVs in 
developing countries (350,000 people) depended on Indian generic medications.3 
Therefore, any developments in India‟s domestic legislative and regulatory 
framework regarding generic production would significantly impact on the public 
health of many people in developing and least developed countries (LDCs).  
The first part of this article sets the legal and regulatory context of this case, 
discussing India‟s domestic legislative and regulatory scheme, and how its 
international obligations regarding access to medicines have been addressed and 
implemented. It then considers the background to the case as well as the trial and 
appeal judgments. This is followed by a discussion of patent linkage which argues 
that its rejection by the High Court was correct. The article concludes with an 
argument about the undesirability of the current access to medicines regime where 
priority is given to the protection of intellectual property (IP). It contends that India 
has an opportunity to shift this focus. 
 
THE ACCESS TO MEDICINES REGIME 
In order to understand the Bayer case, it is necessary to discuss the interplay 
between access to medicines and intellectual property in the international context 
and India‟s domestic implementation of the regime. The three frameworks 
 
2 Medecins Sans Frontieres, HIV/AIDS Progress Under Siege (2009), 
http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/publications/alert/article.cfm?id=3969&cat=alert-article viewed 1 September 2010. 
3 Medecins Sans Frontieres, MSF: The Future of Generic Medicines Made in India (2005), 
http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/publications/article.cfm?id=1504&cat=ideas-opinions  viewed 13 February 2011; Gastle 
C and Martyn M, “Getting Affordable Drugs to the Developing World”, Lawyers Weekly (2010), 
http://www.lawyersweekly.ca/index.php?section=article&articleid=1215 viewed 1 September 2010. 
 considered are the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
(TRIPS), the Drugs and Cosmetics Act 1940 (IND) and the Patents Act 1970 (IND). 
 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property and public 
health considerations 
Commonly referred to as TRIPS, this agreement is one of 18 agreements annexed 
to the Agreement establishing the World Trade Organisation (WTO), which came 
into force in 1995.4 The Preamble to TRIPS states that its purpose is to “reduce 
distortions and impediments to international trade” while considering the need to 
“promote effective and adequate protection of intellectual property rights” and 
ensuring that such rights do not “become barriers to legitimate trade”.5 However, 
TRIPS is better known for providing a minimum set of IP protection standards which 
WTO member states are obliged to comply with and implement. Although TRIPS 
only imposed minimum standards, its Articles imposing patent protection over 
products translated into increasing the domestic standards of intellectual property 
protection laws of many of its signatory states. One of the states so affected was 
India which, prior to becoming a WTO member, did not have patents over products 
(discussed below).  
There are various key provisions in TRIPS regarding patent protection over 
products. Article 27 defines what is “patentable”. Article 28 confers on the patent 
owner exclusive rights by preventing third parties from “making, using, offering for 
sale, selling or importing for these purposes” the patented product in question. 
Article 33 provides for a minimum period of 20 years‟ protection of the patent, 
commencing from the patent application filing date. 
However, the WTO did recognise that a balance between trade and health interests 
had to be struck and also acknowledged the primacy of pubic health. For example, 
 
4 World Health Organisation, WTO and the TRIPS Agreement (undated), 
http://www.who.int/medicines/areas/policy/wto_trips/en/index.html viewed 1 September 2010. 
5 World Trade Organisation, Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights – Preamble (1994), 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips_01_e.htm viewed 1 September 2010.  
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Art 8 provided that member states, when incorporating TRIPS obligations into their 
national laws, were obliged to adopt necessary measures “to protect public health 
and nutrition”, provided the measures were consistent with TRIPS. Subsequent 
agreements and declarations relating to TRIPS allowed TRIPS Articles to be 
interpreted in a way which supported public health and the access to medicine 
regime, acting as exceptions to the IP protections. 
India’s Drugs and Cosmetics Act 1940 (IND) 
The Drugs and Cosmetics Act 1940 (IND) and its associated Drugs and Cosmetic 
Rules 1945 (IND) are part of India‟s drug standard and control system. Under s 5, a 
Drugs Technical Advisory Board oversees the operation and administration of the 
Drugs and Cosmetics Act. The board consists of a number of members, including 
the DCGI. The Act and its Regulations provide a framework for drug and cosmetics 
safety, analysis, manufacturing, sale and distribution in India. For the purposes of 
analysing the Bayer case, s 2, which provides that the provisions of the Drugs and 
Cosmetics Act, “shall be in addition to, and not in derogation of” other laws, is worth 
noting.  
Patents Act 1970 (IND) 
Prior to the Patents (Amendment) Act 2005 (the Amending Act), India‟s Patents Act 
only bestowed patent protection on methods or processes in the manufacture of 
products and not the actual products.6 This enabled India to produce generic 
medications, giving it a leading role in the developing world. Statistics from the MSF 
dated 2005 stated that an estimated 70% of 25,000 AIDS patients treated by MSF 
in 27 countries used Indian generics;7 2006 statistics stated that 84% of the AIDS 
drugs used by MSF to treat over 60,000 patients in more than 30 countries were 
generic medicines from India.8  
 
6 Patents Act 1970 (IND), s 5 (now omitted). 
7 World Health Organisation, Will the Lifeline of Affordable Medicines for Poor Countries Be Cut? Consequences of Medicines 
Patenting in India (2005), http://www.who.int/hiv/amds/MSFopinion.pdf viewed 1 September 2010. 
8 Medecins Sans Frontieres, As Novartis Challenges India’s Patent Law, MSF Warns Access to Medicines is Under Threat 
(2006), http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/press/release.cfm?id=1870 viewed 1 September 2010. 
 Upon becoming a member of the WTO, India was required to comply with the 
TRIPS Agreement. However, in light of its status as a developing country, India was 
given until 1 January 2005 to comply,9 and was also required to allow companies to 
apply for patents during this 10-year transitional period. Accordingly, transitional 
arrangements were made in TRIPS in the form of a mailbox system. Specifically, Art 
70.8 of TRIPS required parties to “provide as from the date of entry into force of the 
WTO Agreement a means by which applications for patents” for inventions could be 
filed; and to apply the criteria for patentability to these applications as if the criteria 
were being applied on the date of filing. Patent protection would be conferred from 
the date the patent was granted but the patent term protection of 20 years 
commenced from the date the application was filed. 
As a result, India set up a “mailbox” facility via the Patents (Amendment) Act 1999 
(IND). Section 24A was inserted into the Patents Act, allowing applicants wishing to 
apply for patents in India to file an application with India. The applications would be 
stored in this mailbox, not to be considered until 31 December 2004, at which time 
TRIPS would be fully effective in India. If the application was successful, the 20-
year term of protection would be counted from the date of the patent application, but 
protection was effectively only from the date the patent was granted.10 This 
therefore offered generic manufacturers a substantial advantage and benefited the 
access to medicines regime significantly: a particular pharmaceutical product the 
subject of a patent application could be generically manufactured at least until 31 
December 2004 or even further, for while the application remained in the mailbox 
and a patent had not been granted, no protection existed.11   
There was a further Patents (Amendment) Act 2002, but the 2005 Amending Act 
brought India into full compliance with TRIPS intellectual property protection 
obligations. Significantly, it removed s 5 so that applications for patent protection 
 
9 Intellectual Property Watch, India’s TRIPS Compliance Effort Could be Test Case (2005), http://www.ip-
watch.org/weblog/2005/03/24/indias-trips-compliance-effort-could-be-test-case/ viewed 1 September 2010. 
10 World Health Organisation, n 7. 
11 World Health Organisation, n 7. 
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over pharmaceutical products received after 1 January 2005 (as well as those 
awaiting decision in the mailbox) could potentially succeed, provided they satisfied 
the patent eligibility elements. Therefore, where generic manufacturers wished to 
produce a pharmaceutical product that had been granted a patent after 1 January 
2005, they would be required to seek permission from the patent-holder or obtain a 
compulsory licence under TRIPS and the Patents Act provisions (discussed below).  
 
THE CASE 
It was within this legal framework that both the trial division decision (unrep, Delhi 
High Court, Ravindra Bhat J, 18 August 2009)12 and the appeal for Bayer Corp v 
Union of India were heard and decided in the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi.  
The case revolved around sorafenib tosylate, a drug used to treat kidney and liver 
cancer.13 In March 2008, Bayer Corporation was granted a patent by the Indian 
Patent Office over this drug, which Bayer marketed under the brand name Nexavar. 
A month‟s worth of treatment (120 tablets) cost 285,000 rupees (US$5,700).14  
In July 2008, Bayer became aware of Cipla‟s intention to market the generic version 
of this drug under the name Soranib and contacted the DCGI, requesting that 
marketing approval not be granted to Cipla on the basis of Bayer holding the patent. 
In October 2008, Bayer filed a petition to the Delhi High Court for a writ restraining 
the DCGI from granting the relevant licence.  
At both first instance and in the appeal, Bayer argued that the following factors 
supported its petition to restrain the granting of marketing approval: 
 
12 See Bayer Corp v UOI (2009), http://lobis.nic.in/dhc/SRB/judgement/18-08-2009/SRB18082009MATC78332008.pdf 
viewed 1 September 2010. 
13 National Cancer Institute, Sorafenib Tosylate (2006), http://www.cancer.gov/cancertopics/druginfo/sorafenibtosylate viewed 
1 September 2010. 
14 Universities Allied for Essential Medicine, India Supreme Court to Hear Patent Linkage Case (2010), 
http://essentialmedicine.org/blog/india-supreme-court-hear-patent-linkage-case viewed 1 September 2010. 
  a collective reading of the Patents Act and the Drugs and Cosmetics Act 
should be adopted by the courts; 
 the effect of this collective reading of the two Acts was that a patent linkage 
system would apply to the Indian generic medication market; and 
 Cipla‟s Soranib was, in effect, a “spurious drug” as defined by s 17B of the 
Drugs and Cosmetics Act.15 
Bayer based its argument in support of a collective reading of the two Acts by 
pointing to ss 48 and 156 of the Patents Act and s 2 of the Drugs and Cosmetics 
Act. As the patent in question was granted after the commencement of the Act and 
was for an article or substance, s 48(2)(a) applied, providing that the patent 
conferred on Bayer (as patentee) “the exclusive right ... to make, use, exercise, sell 
or distribute” that article or substance in India. Section 156 provides that the patent 
“shall have ... like effect against Government as it has against any other person”. 
Section 2 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act provides that this Act operates in addition 
to other Indian laws.  
Thus, the two Acts should be read together. The effect of a collective reading meant 
that the patent “has the same effect on the Government as on others”. Since the 
DCGI oversaw the operation and acted upon the provisions of the Drugs and 
Cosmetics Act, and as “functionaries of the Central Government”, the DCGI was 
also bound and obliged to respect Bayer‟s patent rights. As part of this, the DCGI 
“needed to ensure that his decision on the grant of marketing approval should not 
derogate” from other applicable laws. If marketing approval were granted, it would 
breach s 48 of the Patents Act as the patent rights to which Bayer was entitled 
would no longer be exclusive in nature. Effectively, Bayer attempted to tack an 
additional condition onto the Drugs and Cosmetics Act under which the DCGI, as 
well as needing to have regard to the provisions of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 
would also be required to consider the existence of a patent over the product.  
 
15 As this third issue is not relevant to the question of patent linkage, it is not considered in this article. 
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Cipla disagreed, arguing that Bayer‟s argument was made on the incorrect 
assumption that any marketing approval granted by the DCGI would, by itself, 
amount to a patent infringement. The question of whether a patent had been 
infringed was one to be decided by a court of law having regard to the Patents Act 
provisions, and was within neither the jurisdiction nor the powers of the DCGI. Cipla 
then went on to submit that the mere grant of approval was not an act of “making, 
using, offering for sale, selling or importing” the product and thus would not breach s 
48. Cipla also submitted that s 107A (the “Bolar provision” section) clearly exempted 
from patent infringement acts of making, using or selling a patented product where 
such actions were required to obtain information for the purposes of obtaining 
regulatory approval from the DCGI. It was therefore “illogical to argue that when all 
acts leading up to the stage of drug approval are exempt from patent infringement, 
the very act of approval itself amounts to an infringement”. In addition, Cipla argued 
that the imposition of the patent linkage system would be inconsistent with India‟s 
obligations under TRIPS.  
Therefore, the question regarding access to medicine and patent linkage in both 
instances was whether the two Acts should be read together, and if so, whether the 
DCGI was prevented from granting marketing approval over Soranib to Cipla 
because Bayer was the patent owner. 
Trial division judgment 
The trial judge, Bhat J, rejected Bayer‟s submissions and accepted Cipla‟s counter-
arguments. After discussing the history of the Patents Act, he made the following 
points. 
First, the function of a patent is not to grant the patentee “the right to use, offer for 
sale or import” the invention but rather the right to exclude others from doing so. 
Bhat J also noted that under Indian law patents, unlike other IP rights, are 
susceptible to a multiple number of challenges, both pre-grant and post-grant and 
before a number of administrative or judicial bodies. 
 Secondly, only the Controller of Patents16 and patent officers are experts at judging 
what is patentable. Such expertise depends upon “adjudging, on an objective basis, 
whether a product is novel”. Officials operating under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act 
who were required to test product safety and therapeutic efficiency were not so 
equipped. The judge accepted Cipla‟s argument that to impose the obligation upon 
the DCGI to determine patent questions was beyond the intention of the Drugs and 
Cosmetics Act. On a related point, the judge also agreed with Cipla that the 
question of patent infringement must be established before a court of law – to 
accept that the DCGI had this obligation would confer jurisdiction upon the drugs 
agency, denuding the power from the Patents Act bodies. 
Thirdly, Bhat J questioned the ability of the judiciary to assume the application of the 
patent linkage system in India. Noting that, unlike China and the United States, 
Indian laws did not expressly allow for patent linkage standards, Bhat J doubted that 
courts should “blaze into an obviously legislative path”. While courts were required 
sometimes to fill in gaps, in this case, the gap was more of “oceanic proportions”.  
Applying this to s 156, it seemed that all s 156 required was that the government 
and public officials respect the patent and not infringe it. Nothing in the Patents Act 
or the Drugs and Cosmetics Act indicated a parliamentary intention to “place patent 
superintendence or policing powers with drug agencies”. To interpret otherwise 
would result in the judiciary “making a policy choice ... [and] overstepping its 
obvious interpretive bounds”. 
Finally, the court questioned the desirability of introducing patent linkage into India‟s 
domestic legal system. After noting that the European Union had expressly 
disapproved of the practice, the judge also discussed the negative effects of patent 
linkage: 
 it would blur responsibility between the Patent Office and the Drugs and 
Cosmetics Act bodies; 
 
16 While the full title of this office is the Controller General of Patents, Designs and Trade Marks, s73(1) of the Patents Act 
states the office will be referred to as “the Controller of Patents for the purposes of this Act.” 
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 it would transform patents, originally private property rights, into public 
rights, enforceable by public authorities; and 
 it would violate India‟s public health obligations under TRIPS. 
Appellate judgment 
The same issues arose for decision before the appeal court. Muralidhar J wrote the 
leading judgment, essentially agreeing with Bhat J on all points. With regard to the 
interpretation of s 156, the court classified it as imposing a “negative obligation on 
the government not to infringe. It creates no positive obligation on the central 
government or any department thereof to protect.” In addition, there was no mention 
in the Drugs and Cosmetics Act that marketing approval was to be refused if the 
product in question was patented; nor did the granting of such an approval result in 
patent infringement or constitute abetting any infringement. The role of the DCGI 
was within the framework of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act: “[T]here is no scope for 
the DCGI to travel beyond the Drugs and Cosmetics Act and ensure the protection 
of the patent by refusing marketing approval” to a patented product. Finally, the 
court also agreed that the introduction of a patent linkage system would breach 
India‟s obligations under TRIPS and that the court could not impliedly introduce the 
system into Indian law. 
Analysis 
In light of both judgments‟ dismissal of Bayer‟s attempts at patent linkage, and the 
court‟s recognition of its negative effects, it is unsurprising that many hailed the 
decision as safeguarding public health and generic medication production.17 
Unfortunately, closer inspection of the decisions would indicate that, while the court 
was reluctant to implement patent linkage, it did not reject the concept outright. One 
notable feature throughout the judgments was the reluctance of the court and the 
Indian Government to acknowledge its international human right obligations, 
 
17 Medecins Sans Frontieres, Indian Court Gives Boost to Access to Medicines as Latest Appeal by Bayer is Rejected (2010), 
http://www.msfaccess.org/media-room/press-releases/press-release-
detail/index.html%3ftx_ttnews[tt_news]=1601&cHash=60a81ed66d viewed 31 August 2010. 
 especially the right to health and medical treatment. The court avoided the issue on 
the basis that it was a matter for the legislature – a policy question for the 
government. It would seem therefore that it is theoretically possible that the 
Supreme Court may decide that it is an area on which the judiciary can decide and 
rule that Bayer‟s submission on a collective reading of the respective Acts is correct.   
PATENT LINKAGE AND PUBLIC HEALTH 
This part of the article examines the system of patent linkage, how its introduction 
would adversely affect India‟s public health obligations, and why the Supreme Court 
should rule against its operation in India.  
 “Patent linkage” 
Patent linkage is “the practice of linking the granting of ... any regulatory approval 
for a generic medicinal product to the status of a patent for the originator reference 
product”.18 As discussed, Bayer‟s argument was for patent linkage to occur in India. 
The European Commission has noted that patent linkage offers a platform for the 
pharmaceutical industry to prevent sales of the generic product by threatening 
retailers who sell or stock the generic version with action for breach of patent 
rights.19  
Once the availability of a medication is recognised as being dependent on the 
existence of a patent, various complications arise, including: 
 the adverse impact on the public health exceptions in TRIPS; and 
 the enforcement and recognition of patent rights by a body not qualified to 
do so. 
Impact on public health exceptions 
As discussed, a number of TRIPS Articles were interpreted to operate as an 
exception to the protection of intellectual property. In regard to public health and 
 
18 European Commission, European Commission Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry Final Report, Part 1 (2009) p 130, 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/staff_working_paper_part1.pdf  viewed 13 February 2011. 
19 European Commission, n 18, pp 338-339. 
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access to medication, the two common exceptions are the Bolar provisions and 
compulsory licensing.  
Bolar provisions allow generic manufacturers to prepare production and regulatory 
procedures before patents expire so that products can be ready for sale as soon as 
the patent ends, rather than having to go through the lengthy preparatory process 
only after the patent period is over.20 Article 30 allows members to provide “limited 
exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent” provided the exceptions do 
not unreasonably conflict with the patent-holder‟s rights or legitimate interests. In a 
2000 dispute between the European Commission and Canada, a WTO Panel 
considered the legality of two provisions of the Canadian Patent Act 1985 which 
allowed third parties to “construct, use or sell” a patented invention solely for uses 
related to the “development and submission of information” required by relevant 
domestic laws and to stockpile the patented product intended for sale after patent 
expiration.21 The Panel held that the Bolar provisions were one of the “limited 
exceptions” modifying the exclusive rights, as allowed by Art 30.22 Section 107A of 
India‟s Patents Act implements Art 30 so that “any act of making, constructing, 
using, selling or importing a patented invention solely for the uses reasonably 
relating to the development and submission of information required by law” shall not 
be considered as infringement.  
Compulsory licensing occurs where a third party obtains authorisation to perform 
acts that would legally require the patent-holder‟s permission.23 In the context of 
generic medicines, the third party would be the generic manufacturer obtaining 
authorisation to produce pharmaceutical products the subject of patent protection. 
Article 31 of TRIPS provides that where the law of a WTO member “allows for other 
use of the subject matter of a patent without the authorisation” of the patent owner 
 
20 Mutume G, “Health and Intellectual Property” (2001) 15 Africa Recovery 14. 
21 Panel Report, Canada – Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, WTO Doc WT/DS114/R (17 March 2000), 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/7428d.pdf viewed 1 September 2010. 
22 Panel Report, n 21, p 40.  
23 de Carvalho NP, The TRIPS Regime of Patent Rights (2nd ed, Kluwer Law International, 2005) p 315. 
 (ie, pharmaceutical companies), certain procedural requirements must be 
respected. Therefore, although not expressly using the term, Art 31(b) 
acknowledged the possibility of compulsory licensing, provided that the government 
issuing the licence has made attempts to obtain permission from the patent-holder 
(except for a case of national or extreme emergency) and that use was 
predominantly for that country‟s domestic market (Art 31(f)).  
The last requirement was uncontroversial until it was realised that countries most in 
need of medicines usually had little (or no) manufacturing, production or research 
and development capability.24 This realisation led to the 2001 WTO meeting in 
Doha, Qatar, and resulted in the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public 
Health (the Doha Declaration). Paragraphs 1 to 3 recognised the “gravity of public 
health problems” and how IP protection can impact upon this issue. Paragraph 4 
confirmed that TRIPS must be “interpreted and implemented in a manner 
supporting [members‟] right to ... promote access to medicines for all”. Paragraph 5 
then confirmed the right of member states to use compulsory licensing under 
TRIPS, Art 31 (the term was expressly used) in cases of national or extreme 
emergency. More importantly, however, the paragraph also provided a non-
exhaustive list of such emergencies including HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and 
other epidemics. Such references recognised that an emergency could be a long-
term problem.25 However, paragraph 6 triggered the solution to the conundrum 
posed by Art 31(f). Recognising that some countries had “insufficient or no 
manufacturing capabilities in the pharmaceutical sector”, it instructed the TRIPS 
General Council to find an expeditious solution to the problem. On 30 August 2003, 
the General Council adopted the Decision of the WTO General Council on the 
Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration of the TRIPS Agreement 
and Public Health (the Decision). Article 2 of this Decision allowed a country which 
issued the compulsory licence to export products to an “eligible importing country”. 
 
24 Correa C, World Health Organisation, Implications of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health 
(2002) pp 19-20, http://www.who.int/medicines/areas/policy/WHO_EDM_PAR_2002.3.pdf viewed 31 August 2010. 
25 Correa, n 24, p 17. 
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Article 1(b) of the Decision defines such a country as a LDC. On 6 December 2005, 
the General Council amended TRIPS by inserting Art 2 of the Decision into TRIPS 
where it became known as Art 31bis.26  
Sections 84, 92 and 92A of the Patents Act address compulsory licensing 
circumstances in India. Section 84 provides that a licence may be granted by the 
Controller of Patents if the applicant can establish that “reasonable requirements of 
the public with respect to the patented invention have not been satisfied”, or “the 
patented invention is not available to the public at a reasonably affordable price”, or 
“the patented invention is not worked in the territory of India”. However, in 
circumstances of “national emergency ... extreme urgency or public non-commercial 
use”, where the Indian Central Government is satisfied that it is necessary for a 
compulsory licence to be granted, s 92 allows the government to make a 
declaration to that effect, so that an applicant for the compulsory licence is granted 
that licence on such terms as the Controller of Patents sees fit. “Public health crisis” 
is referred to in s 92 as an example of the three circumstances. Section 92A allows 
the export of products manufactured under a compulsory licence, where the 
receiving country is one “having insufficient or no manufacturing capacity in the 
pharmaceutical sector for the concerned product to address public health 
problems”. These provisions recognising the existence of exceptional 
circumstances reflect the operation of TRIPS Arts 31(f) and 31bis. 
Should patent linkage be allowed, the operation of patent linkage would render the 
above exceptions useless and result in delayed access to the generic products. 
Bolar provisions would be of no effect as the existence of a patent over the 
pharmaceutical product would halt any granting by the relevant drug authority of 
marketing approval for that product. The applicant would be required to wait until 
the patent expires or is deemed invalid before applying for marketing approval. Not 
only would the availability of the generic product be significantly delayed, but the 
 
26 World Trade Organisation, Members OK Amendment to Make Health Flexibility Permanent (2005), 
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres05_e/pr426_e.htm viewed 31 August 2010.  
 patent-holder would enjoy additional market exclusivity while the generic product 
was awaiting marketing approval.27 With regard to compulsory licensing, patent 
linkage does not affect the government‟s ability to override patent-holders‟ exclusive 
rights by allowing compulsory licensing in certain situations. However, for a generic 
product to be eligible to be produced and available under a compulsory licence, the 
Drugs and Cosmetics Act and its Rules require the generic product to have the 
requisite marketing approval. The impact upon compulsory licensing therefore 
would be an extension of the problems arising from patent linkage under the Bolar 
provisions. Unless the patent-holder gives permission for the product to be 
produced under a compulsory licence, the inability to grant the generic product the 
requisite marketing approval prevents the product from being utilised by compulsory 
licensing and thus renders the exception useless.28 
Enforcement and recognition of patent rights 
One reason for the rejection of Bayer‟s argument was that the intricacies involved in 
patent linkage exceeded the scope of the DCGI‟s duties under the Drugs and 
Cosmetics Act. A drug regulatory authority‟s ability to determine patent infringement 
and enforce patent rights has been commonly cited as reasons against patent 
linkage. Imposing patent linkage would result in the drug regulatory body enforcing 
a company‟s private patent monopoly rights, despite the fact that the body would 
not have the power to decide the validity of the patent.29 Galantucci notes that the 
burden would be on the generic manufacturer, as the applicant, to prove that the 
patent is invalid or ineffective.30 In addition, it would distract the drug regulatory 
 
27 Galantucci R, “Data Protection in a US–Malaysia Free Trade Agreement: New Barriers to Market Access for Generic Drug 
Manufacturers” (2007) 17 Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal 1083 at 1098. 
28 Medecins Sans Frontieres, Access to Medicines at Risk Across the Globe: What to Watch Out For in Free Trade Agreements 
with the United States (2004), http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/publications/reports/2004/ftaa_05-2004.pdf viewed 31 
August 2010. 
29 Medecins Sans Frontieres, n 28. 
30 Galantucci, n 27. 
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body from its duty to deliver the “green light” for medicines to enter the market by 
ensuring their safety, quality and effectiveness.31 
THE RIGHT TO HEALTH 
As well as breaching public health obligations, patent linkage is also inconsistent 
with the general right to health. Under international law, the right to health has been 
recognised in numerous documents.32 Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights provides that “everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate 
for the health and well-being of himself and of his family including ... medical care”. 
In addition, Art 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR) requires state parties to “recognise the right of everyone to the 
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health”.  
As part of this obligation, state parties must take steps necessary for “the 
prevention, treatment and control of” diseases and the “creation of conditions which 
would assure to all medical service and medical attention in the event of sickness”. 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), on the other hand, 
does not directly provide for the right of public health, but several of its provisions 
allow the curtailment of other rights “where such restrictions are necessary to 
protect ... public health”. The World Health Organisation (WHO) Constitution starts 
with a declaration that “health is a state of complete physical, mental and social 
well-being” and “the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health” is a 
fundamental human right. Governments are responsible for the health of their 
peoples and must fulfil this obligation “only by the provision of adequate health and 
social measures”. These instruments provide the basic principles that “underpin 
approaches to the issues of and solutions to increasing access to medicines”.33  
 
31 Medecins Sans Frontieres, Indian Court Gives Boost to Access to Medicines – Bayer Appeal Rejected (2010), 
http://www.msf.org.uk/india_bosst_access_medicines_20100209.news viewed 31 August 2010. 
32 See Hunt P, “The Health and Human Rights Movement: Progress and Obstacles” (2008) 15 JLM 714; Potts H, “The Right to 
Health in Public Health: Is This a New Approach?” (2008) 15 JLM 725; Freckelton I, “Health and Human Rights: Challenges 
of Implementation and Cultural Change” (2008) 15 JLM 794 
33 Leach B, Paluzzi J and Munderri P, UN Millennium Project, Prescription for Healthy Development: Increasing Access to 
Medicines. Report of the Task Force on HIV/AIDS, Malaria, TB, and Access to Essential Medicines, Working Group on Access 
 The next question concerns the specifics of how governments are to satisfy the 
access to medicine obligation. Resolution 2000/7 from the Sub-Commission on the 
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights34 reminds states of the “primacy of 
human rights obligations over economic policies and agreements” and expressly 
refers to TRIPS as an example of the latter. In 2006, the United Nations Secretary-
General presented a report to the General Assembly, written by then special 
rapporteur of the right to health, Paul Hunt.35 The report argued that the 
responsibilities of states included ensuring that medicines are “available, 
accessible, culturally acceptable and of good quality”.36 Availability involved 
ensuring that existing medicines are “available in sufficient quantities”.37 
Compulsory licensing was cited as one method of assisting with availability. 
Accessibility had four dimensions:38 
 availability in all parts of a country;  
 economically accessible and affordable;  
 without discrimination on any prohibited grounds (eg race, sex, ethnicity or 
socio-economic status); and  
 accessibility of knowledge and information about that product.  
The report also provided that, as part of this right, the state‟s duty to protect (as 
provided for in General Comment No 14) required a state to “ensure that third 
parties do not obstruct enjoyment of the right to health”.39 
As a soft law and recognising that nations differ in economic and social 
circumstances and status, international law only acts to provide the framework and 
 
to Essential Medicines (2005), http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/documents/TF5-medicines-Complete.pdf viewed 1 
September 2010.  
34 The Sub-Commission was a subsidiary body of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, the latter being replaced 
by the United Nations Human Rights Council in 2006. 
35 Hunt P, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of 
Physical and Mental Health UN Doc A/61/338 (13 September 2006). 
36 Hunt, n 35, p 13. 
37 Hunt, n 35, p 13. 
38 Hunt, n 35, p 13.  
39 Hunt, n 35, p 15. 
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guidelines. General Comment 3 of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (CESCR) which monitors implementation of the ICESCR provides that there 
be a “minimum core obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, 
minimum essential levels of each of the rights” as being incumbent upon every state 
party. State Parties have “a margin of discretion”40 in assessing the appropriate 
measures to implement their responsibilities; however, under Art 2 of the ICESCR, 
they are obliged to “take steps ... to the maximum of its available resources”. In 
terms of access to medicines, CESCR‟s General Comment No 14 of 2000, which 
looked at Art 12 of the ICESCR, stated that “medical service” in Art 12 includes the 
provision of essential drugs as defined by the WHO.42 In turn, the WHO defines 
“essential drugs” (termed “essential medicines”) as medicines which “satisfy the 
priority health care needs of a population ... with due regard to public health 
relevance, evidence of efficacy and safety, and comparative cost-effectiveness”. 
The concept of essential medicine is “intended to be flexible and adaptable to many 
different situations” but what medicines are to be considered essential is a “national 
responsibility”.43 The reliance upon social circumstances as determinants to what 
are essential medicines is reflected in the fact that the WHO essential medicines list 
has changed 16 times over the past 30 years.44 
India 
In India, there is no express right to health. However, in response to India‟s 
obligations under the ICESCR and the ICCPR, India enacted the Protection of 
Human Rights Act 1993 (IND). Section 2 defines “human rights” to include the right 
to life. The Indian Constitution also makes frequent reference to the need to protect 
health. Article 21 acknowledges the right to and protection of life. Article 39(e) 
 
40 United Nations Economic and Social Council, General Comment No 14: Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (22nd sess, UN Doc E/C.12/2000/4 (11 August 2000) p 
13. 
42 United Nations Economic and Social Council, n 40, p 15. 
43 World Health Organisation, Essential Medicines (2010), http://www.who.int/trade/glossary/story025/en/index.html viewed 2 
September 2010. 
44 World Health Organisation, Essential Medicines (2010), 
http://www.who.int/medicines/services/essmedicines_def/en/index.html viewed 2 September 2010. 
 directs state policy towards securing the health and strength of workers. Article 47 
requires the state to regard the “raising of the level of nutrition and ... the 
improvement of public health” as a primary duty.  
In turn, the constitutional courts (particularly the Indian Supreme Court) have been 
quite proactive in acknowledging these references as well as international 
obligations generally. In Punjab v Ram Lubhaya Bagga (1998) 4 SCC 117, the 
Supreme Court held that Art 21‟s reference to the right to live “does not mean mere 
survival or animal existence, but includes the right to live with human dignity”. The 
court added:  
...Further to secure protection of one‟s life is one of the foremost obligation of 
the State, it is not merely a right enshrined under Article 21 but an obligation 
cast on the State to provide this both under Article 21 and under Article 47 of the 
Constitution. The obligation includes improvement of public health as its primary 
duty.  
In ESC Ltd v Bose (1992) 1 SCC 441, in considering an industrial dispute and the 
rights of the worker, the Indian Supreme Court cited the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and the ICESCR as recognising that the right to life included the right 
to physical and mental health. Health was defined as including medical care and 
health facilities (at [6]). In Punjab v Chawla (1997) 2 SCC 83 the court considered a 
public servant‟s right of reimbursement for medical treatment, and noted that it is 
“settled law that right to health is an integral to right to life. Government has 
constitutional obligation to provide the health facilities.”  
There has also been indirect consideration by the Supreme Court of India‟s 
“minimum core obligations” under General Comment 3 when considering the right to 
health. In Paschim Banga Khet Mazdoorsamity v State of West Bengal and Anor 
(1996) 4 SCC 37, the court considered the quality of treatment provided to a 
labourer by various state hospitals. In discussing the level and quality of medical 
and hospital services, the court acknowledged that financial and other resources 
were required to provide such facilities, but observed: 
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[A]t the same time it cannot be ignored that it is the constitutional obligation of 
the State to provide adequate medical services to the people. Whatever is 
necessary for this purpose has to be done. 
The court further held that the state “cannot avoid its constitutional obligation ... on 
account of financial constraints” in discharging its duty to preserve human life. In 
this case therefore, the court appeared to consider the right to health as more than 
a minimal core obligation – maximum resources were to be devoted to it. In Punjab 
v Ram Lubhaya Bagga (1998) 4 SCC 117 however, the court considered that the 
state was not breaching its constitutional obligations in having a policy which 
resulted in an injured worker being unable to claim reimbursement for the provision 
of certain medical services. While the right to health was regarded as a priority, it 
was not an absolute right (at 132): 
A man is a social animal. He cannot live without the cooperation of large 
number of persons. Every article one uses is the contribution of many. Hence 
every individual right has to give way to the right of public at large. This ... 
applies when there is any constraint on the health budget on account of financial 
stringencies.  
The provision of the “best possible health facility has direct co-relation with 
finances” and thus the state was entitled to take into account the availability of 
resources.  
While at first glance it seems that the Supreme Court in Bagga took less of a stance 
on the constitutional right to health than in Mazdoorsamity, on closer inspection both 
judgments in fact regarded this right equally. Both cases acknowledged the primacy 
of the right to health as a state obligation towards its citizens. The state was 
required to utilise its resources to the maximum to provide minimal essential 
services. Maximum utility does not equate to absolute utility or complete medical 
services. In Bagga, the Supreme Court recognised that the policy provided 
adequate care and financial support – the state thus had discharged its minimal 
 core obligations and was justified in considering the availability of resources in 
deciding whether it wished to do more. 
Therefore, the right to health and treatment has been expressly acknowledged 
within India, significantly by the Indian Supreme Court. Although there is no express 
constitutional right to medical treatment, the above case law, along with the public 
health exceptions allowed in the Patents Act reflecting TRIPS, indicates that India is 
aware of and has implemented this right. Were the Supreme Court to allow Bayer‟s 
argument in its appeal for patent linkage, it would be inconsistent with this human 
rights-based approach and more importantly, with India‟s international obligations. 
 
CONCLUSION  
Should the Supreme Court allow Bayer‟s argument for patent linkage, it would 
adversely affect access to medicines, whether they are on the WHO‟s essential 
medicine list or not. In addition, allowing the appeal would be inconsistent with 
previous authority from the Supreme Court upholding the constitutional (and 
general) right to health. Granted, past authority only looked at rights to health by 
employees and government workers and the provision of health and medical 
services; however, this has involved the constitutional courts paying significant 
attention to India‟s international human rights obligations and being willing to make 
concessions in support of these rights, unless there were significant practical 
considerations, such as the availability of resources. 
The Indian Supreme Court heard Bayer‟s appeal in August 2010. Commentators 
urge nations involved in free-trade negotiations with countries such as the United 
States to “simply say no to efforts to coerce them into accepting patent/registration 
linkage”. 45 Likewise, it is possible that the court admitted the appeal as a test case 
as well as taking it as an opportunity of saying „no‟ to Bayer and other future 
 
45 Baker B, “Ending Drug Registration Apartheid: Taming Data Exclusivity and Patent/Registration Linkage” (2008) 34 
American Journal of Law and Medicine 303 at 341. 
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potential pressures to impose patent linkage. There have been promising 
developments which support a positive outcome. For example, despite admitting the 
appeal  in 2010, the Supreme Court refused to stay the Delhi High Court‟s appeal 
judgment,46 effectively enabling Cipla to launch its generic medication (ironically 
also in August) at approximately one-tenth of the price of Nexavar.47 This refusal 
may indicate that the judiciary is being persuaded to rule against a system where 
public health is only an incidental part of the focus on intellectual property – a focus 
that is unhelpful and unhealthy. The Bayer case is only a very recent example of 
how domestic nations still prioritise intellectual property over human rights. Instead 
nations should shift their focus to make access to medicines a primary right, and 
how their obligations under international law can assist in this. India has 
demonstrated its potential to comply with its international obligations via the various 
amendments made to its Patents Act as well as its domestic implementation of 
various rights Conventions. This appeal before the Supreme Court may be the 
opportunity for it to apply its favourable treatment of human rights in the vital context 
of the right to medical care and treatment.  
 
 
POSTSCRIPT:  In December 2010, the Supreme Court of India consisting of 
justices A Alam and R M Lodha dismissed the appeal, noting that Bayer‟s 
simultaneous suit against Cipla for patent infringement, filed at the same time as the 
marketing approval appeal was still pending before the Delhi High Court.48 The 
decision to dismiss the appeal was described as one of a technicality or 
jurisdictional convenience: “[I]t means that the [Supreme Court] believes that this 
 
46 “SC Rejects Bayer’s Plea to Stay Cipla’s Cancer Clone”, Economic Times (2 March 2010), 
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/news-by-industry/healthcare/biotech/pharmaceuticals/SC-rejects-Bayers-plea-to-
stay-Ciplas-cancer-clone/articleshow/5631323.cms viewed 2 September 2010. 
47 Datta PT, “Cipla to Launch Generic Version of Bayer’s Kidney Cancer Drug”, Hindu Business Online (8 April 2010), 
http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/2010/04/09/stories/2010040951170200.htm viewed 2 September 2010. 
48 “SC Rejects Bayer Plea” Business Standard  (2 December 2010), http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/sc-rejects-
bayer-plea/416893/  viewed 13 February 2011. 
 case can be dealt with at the [Delhi] high court since the patent infringement case is 
already ongoing there.”49 
 
49 “Bayer’s Plea to Block Low-cost Cancer Drug Dismissed by SC” India Business Review (2 December 2010), 
http://www.businessreviewindia.in/sectors/pharmaceuticals/bayer-s-plea-block-low-cost-cancer-drug-dismissed-sc  viewed 13 
February 2011, quoting Anand Grover. 
